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On the course of Russian history from 1598 to 1856, here at SSEES (UCL), I had to write an essay answering the question: why did Russia win the Great Northern War? And as any honest Finnish person I had to deconstruct the question thus: why did Sweden lose the war? As I might have told you earlier the unofficial motto of Finland (applies especially to sports and in sports especially to ice hockey) is as follows: "It is not about winning, it's about the Swedes losing". Roughly speaking you can witness the same attitude right here:
On the course of Russian history from 1598 to 1856, here at SSEES (UCL), I had to write an essay answering the question: why did Russia win the Great Northern War? And as any honest Finnish person I had to deconstruct the question thus: why did Sweden lose the war? As I might have told you earlier the unofficial motto of Finland (applies especially to sports and in sports especially to ice hockey) is as follows: "It is not about winning, it's about the Swedes losing". Roughly speaking you can witness the same attitude right here:
The Great Northern War: the Winner and the Loser
Why did Russia win the Great Northern War? The answer to a question such as this is without a doubt a complicated one. After all, in terms of historical research questions beginning with why differ greatly from the ones beginning with how. Firstly, the given question already suggests that Russia, as a winner of the war, was superior to Sweden or, at the very least, must have had some indisputable advantage over her adversary. Secondly, the question why did Russia win is in its nature virtually the same as why did Sweden lose. Thirdly, as is commonly known and even accepted, history is written by the victors[1]. Therefore, when analyzing conflicts that had a profound impact on the balance of power and shifted power from one state to another, as was the case of the Great Northern War, it is productive to review the war also from the point of view of the loser, in this case the Kingdom of Sweden.
We should start by studying the nature of these two confronting states. Petrine Russia was a country in transition: aiming for the West and the Baltic Sea but still far from the purpose. Rapid and hasty changes were taking place within Russia, yet no one could have vouched for their endurance. Be that as it may, many of the faults and weaknesses of the backward Muscovite Russia and its establishment could still be clearly detected on the eve of the war in the year 1700. Sweden, on the other hand, was one of the first-class powers in Europe with the most efficient army and definitely one of the most effective state apparatuses. However, the power of the Swedish Kingdom was not established on the basis of an exceptionally strong economy or on overseas colonies (as was the case of France and Great Britain) but on the sheer territorial size of the Kingdom[2]. By the middle of 17th century the Baltic Sea had become practically mare nostrum of the Swedes and in 1700 their state was prepared as ever for the oncoming war[3].
The nature of warfare in the Great Northern War had not changed significantly since the Thirty Years’ War as a result of which Sweden had laid the foundation stone of its empire in 1648. In this previous war the Swedish army had been victorious, among other things, due to its relatively easy financing:
We should start by studying the nature of these two confronting states. Petrine Russia was a country in transition: aiming for the West and the Baltic Sea but still far from the purpose. Rapid and hasty changes were taking place within Russia, yet no one could have vouched for their endurance. Be that as it may, many of the faults and weaknesses of the backward Muscovite Russia and its establishment could still be clearly detected on the eve of the war in the year 1700. Sweden, on the other hand, was one of the first-class powers in Europe with the most efficient army and definitely one of the most effective state apparatuses. However, the power of the Swedish Kingdom was not established on the basis of an exceptionally strong economy or on overseas colonies (as was the case of France and Great Britain) but on the sheer territorial size of the Kingdom[2]. By the middle of 17th century the Baltic Sea had become practically mare nostrum of the Swedes and in 1700 their state was prepared as ever for the oncoming war[3].
The nature of warfare in the Great Northern War had not changed significantly since the Thirty Years’ War as a result of which Sweden had laid the foundation stone of its empire in 1648. In this previous war the Swedish army had been victorious, among other things, due to its relatively easy financing:
With an army well and truly placed on field footing by the state, it would be spurred on to moving as quickly as possible beyond its own borders and out into enemy territory, where it would support itself by greater or lesser sophisticated methods of plunder. To maintain an armed force within the borders would mean economic disaster. Swedish war financing was so conceived that while her army was victorious the system worked perfectly, but any reverse threw all calculations into disarray.[4]
In other words war was to a certain extent even a necessity for Sweden in order to maintain the vastness of the Kingdom. Now, in the Great Northern War, the situation would alter greatly, for the war ended as it began: Sweden being forced to confront several enemies on different fronts within its own borders. Furthermore, unlike in the previous war on German soil, the Northern Empire was now alone with its many vengeful enemies and without its maritime allies due to the Spanish War of Succession. England and France both were engaged elsewhere and could not interfere in a conflict in the Baltic.[5] In the course of the 17th century Sweden had made enemies of Saxony, the Polish Commonwealth and Russia gaining from their hours of weakness. Russia, in particular, had lost its access to the sea in the Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617 as a result of the Time of Troubles. And thus in 1698 it was Peter I of Russia who was initiating the anti-Swedish alliance and sought to bring together all the foes of Sweden. The coalition of Russia, Denmark, Polish Commonwealth and Saxony was completed by Saxon–Danish treaty in September 1699.[6]
Within months Pax Suecica was shattered by disconnected and ineffective attacks of the allies. When Russia finally entered the war in August 1700 Denmark had already been forced to withdraw from the war. In the Treaty of Travendal Sweden had secured its Southern border of the realm and could thus focus completely on the Russian expansion. However, Denmark had suffered only a temporary lost of prestige: the foundation of Danish might, its navy, was left intact and ready to be used as soon as the course of war would change.[7] As soon as the quarrel with Denmark was settled the Swedish forces were on their way to Narva, Estland, where they quickly won the outnumbering yet submissive Russian army. Peter I deserted his troops on the eve of the fight thus confirming his certain defeat. Now, with almost all Russian generals as prisoners of war Charles XII turned his attention to the last remaining enemy, the Saxons, at the gates of Riga and continued his campaign swiftly to the south, into the territory of Polish Commonwealth.[8]
In Russia the Petrine myth is based upon the alleged transformation between the rout at Narva and the triumph at Poltava. This altogether Russian ideal is indeed far from the truth. Indeed Peter I did introduce the Russian state and army with series of quite radical changes that above all sought to establish a rational and consistent system of administration and to bring regularity and discipline both into the army’s hierarchy and to its conduct on the battlefield. Peter’s decree from February 1705 also provided the army with an effective recruiting system, which would supply the officer corps with members of dvorianstvo and the infantry with serfs. Special focus was also put on a growing amount of permanent regiments in order to provide continuity for the officers. These changes were undoubtedly necessary but, because of the wartime situation, they were predominantly done in a chaotic manner.[9]
However, all of these reforms cannot be viewed as par excellence in the frame of Russian military history. The groundwork for the new system was done long before Peter I sat on the Russian throne: the old-style army was gradually abolished and substantial amount of foreign troops were hired to the country’s service in due course of the 17th century. Thus, already by 1680 only 8 per cent of cavalry was that of the old-style. After the Streltsy Uprising of 1698 there was no significant amount of old-style military left in Russia.[10] To summaries Peter’s role as a reformer of Russian military:
Peter took the semi-professional, disorganised forces bequeathed to him by his predecessors and, however haphazardly, gave them the permanent regimental and administrative structure which not only enabled him to win the war, but to develop an ethos and culture which, though much derived from foreign models, was essentially Petrine and peculiarly Russian.[11]
Hence, in Narva, in 1700, the Swedes were already facing a competent enemy: Peter’s army had only recently taken over Azov and won the Turks in a swift war immediately after which it had undertaken the task of conquering Ingria from Sweden. This campaign, however, ended miserably in Narva not because of the backwardness of the Russian army but simply due to the mistakes of Russian generals and Peter’s lack of confidence.[12]
A notable historical myth also suggests that Charles’ first mistake and indeed the fatal one was not to follow fleeing Peter into Pskov, where the rest of Russian army could have been destroyed and thus their attempted expansion could have been annihilated once and for all. However, Charles XII had many good reasons to draw his attention to the south. Firstly, Riga was threatened by a poorly conducted Saxon siege. Secondly, one of Sweden’s enemies and Russia’s only remaining ally, Augustus II of the Polish Commonwealth and Saxony, was yet to be dealt with. Thirdly, one cannot underestimate the purely financial question of maintaining an army of 25,000 Swedes: the army had to be taken as quickly as possible out into the enemy territory where it also should be able to support itself by plunder.[13] The following eight years the Swedish army would operate on Polish and German ground and win a row of victories forcing Augustus and Saxony effectively out of the war.
The second phase of the war started in 1708 with the Swedes marching into Russia. After eight years of pillage in Central Europe the Swedish army was larger and in better shape than ever since 1700. Meanwhile the Russians had not been idle: Ingria and Estland had fallen into their hands by the end of the summer 1704, Saint Petersburg and, more importantly, the Russian Baltic navy had been founded and was well under construction. By now Charles came to the conclusion that an attack on Russia was necessary in order to assure the continuity of Pax Suecica.
Charles XII is often accused of misconducting his Russian campaign and indeed it had several flaws, which we shall examine, but none of them is fatal enough solely to explain the catastrophe that awaited the Northern Empire on Ukrainian steppe. It seems to be common to criticize the Swedish monarch for not taking his adversary seriously and even disregarding the danger of expanding Russia but then again, could any Western power have anticipated the strength of Russia in 1709? Evidently the force of Petrine Russia was in every way unexpected both by Sweden and by the rest of Europe.[14]
While advancing deeper into Russia the Swedish army started to face one hardship after another. Firstly, the retreating Russian troops were using the infamous strategy of scorched earth making it thus much more difficult to sustain the pursuing army. Secondly, the first part of the winter 1708-09 was severely cold causing losses and demoralisation of the Swedish troops. Thirdly, Charles was well aware of the Astrakhan uprising of 1705 and the Cossack discontent caused by Bulavin’s uprising. This was one of the evident reason for the army to turn south, but this was done definitely too early for the following Lewenhaupt’s army, with a wagon train full of supplies for the main army, was caught alone at Lesnaya and almost completely destroyed by Peter’s troops.[15]
By June 1709 Charles’ army was trapped in the middle of Ukrainian steppe, unattainable by supplies or reinforcements from the motherland, supported by Mazepa’s Zaporozhian Cossacks, hoping to provoke the Tatars and Ottomans to conjoin the war and waiting for the Russians to finally engage in a fight. The situation was still far from desperate. Charles had over 20,000 men at arms and victory was still possible if only the Russians could be reached on the battlefield.[16]
When the Russians eventually turned out they were also the ones to issue the challenge for fight by crossing the river Vorskla just north from Poltava. On 27th of June the decisive battle of the war was fought and in this battle the aggressive Swedish style gave finally in for efficient Russian counterattack, which broke the line of the Swedish army and forced them to retreat.[17] Three days later 16.000 Swedes surrendered to 9.000 Russians at Perevolochna due to exhaustion and rampant demoralisation.[18]
After Poltava Charles fled to Turkish Moldavia, where he was eventually taken as a POW by the Ottomans and taken to Istanbul. Before this he managed to incite a conflict between Russia and Turkey. The short war in Moldavia put an end on Peter’s plans of expansion in Black Sea region but gained him twenty years of peace on the perilous Southern border.[19] Ultimately the Russo-Turkish treaty sealed Sweden’s defeat in the war for now Peter was solely focused on his campaign in the Baltic and within months after Poltava the anti-Swedish alliance was re-established with one new member, Prussia, joining in 1714.[20]
The tide had turned and the Swedish stormaktstid was over. Russians captured the rest of Livonia and Estland in 1710 and then moved swiftly into Eastern Sweden taking Vyborg, Kexholm and Åbo by 1713. After the final battle of Storkyro in 1714 the Russian army halted their advance into Sweden and started effectively pillaging the western part of this Swedish territory, from where they intended to retreat once the peace would be signed. This period of Russian occupation of Finland from 1710 to 1721 is known as Greater Wrath because of the terror caused by the Russian troops. However, the havoc was largely a response to the resistance offered by the local population agitated by the officials of the Swedish crown.[21] Also, as a part of this campaign, the Russian navy enjoyed its first victory in Hangö, which enabled the prolonged occupation of Sweden’s Eastern territories and the plundering of Swedish coast up ‘till 1721. The final blow for the Northern Empire was struck in 1719 by Russian navy harassing the Stockholm archipelago and thus threatening the very capital of the realm.[22]
In the Treaty of Nystad Sweden lost Livonia, Estland, Ingria and most of Karelia to Russia. Thus, Peter I had secured his new capital and indeed gained broad access to the Baltic Sea. Sweden, on the other hand, had survived the wreckage relatively well: preserving the Southern border with Denmark and still retaining a foothold in Pomerania. After the death of Charles XII on his campaign in Norway, in 1718, the new monarch, Ulrika Eleonora, was far more inclined to seek truce with the oncoming enemies than her warlike brother. By 1714 Sweden had run out of all resources and thus any capability of conducting war against the allies.[23]
The reasons as to why Sweden lost the Great Northern War are multiple. The most obvious answer would be that the efficient army and the effective state apparatus of the Northern Empire could bear the pressure of the anti-Swedish allies for only as long as the war was fought in the enemy territory. As soon as the destructive war was brought into the insecure borderlands the system started to collapse. Also, it must be mentioned that the enemies, in particular the Russians, had undertaken several reforms that enabled them to confront the Swedes with destructive efficiency. The reluctance of Charles XII to make peace with his enemies can also be regarded as unintentional bonus to the vengeful allies.[24] And finally it must be understood that the Great Northern War was a very complex conflict that lasted for more than two decades and thus Sweden did not lose its status as a great power in a sudden downfall but as a result of a prolonged crisis.
Bibliography:
Evgenii V. Anisimov, “The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress through Coercion in Russia” (New York: M.E. Sharpe: 1993)
Peter Englund, “The Battle that Shook Europe: Poltava and the Birth of the Russian Empire” (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003)
Robert I. Frost, “The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northern Europe, 1558 – 1721” (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000)
Petri Karonen, “Pohjoinen Suurvalta: Ruotsi ja Suomi 1521 – 1809” (Helsinki: WSOY, 2008)
Mauno Koivisto, ”Venäjän idea” (Helsinki: Tammi, 2001)
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